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ABSTRACT
We compare different epistemic notions in the presence of
awareness of propositional variables: the logics of implicit
knowledge (in which explicit knowledge is definable), explicit
knowledge, and speculative knowledge. Different notions of
bisimulation are suitable for these logics. We provide corre-
spondence between bisimulation and modal equivalence on
image-finite models for these logics. The logic of speculative
knowledge is equally expressive as the logic of explicit knowl-
edge, and the logic of implicit knowledge is more expressive
than both. We also provide axiomatizations for the three
logics — only the one for speculative knowledge is novel.
Then we move to the study of dynamics by recalling action
models incorporating awareness. We show that any conceiv-
able change of knowledge or awareness can be modelled in
this setting, we give a complete axiomatization for the dy-
namic logic of implicit knowledge. The dynamic versions of
all three logics are, surprising, equally expressive.
Keywords
modal logic, awareness, bisimulation, dynamics
1. INTRODUCTION
Motivating example. Explicit knowledge is often defined
as implicit knowledge plus awareness, with implicit knowl-
edge given by the standard modal box [4, 9]. Thus, to ex-
press that ‘agent i knows ϕ explicitly’, KEi ϕ, we use formu-
las of the form iϕ ∧ Aiϕ. In such frameworks, awareness
is typically modelled as a function A that indicates the set
of formulas each agent is aware of at each state; hence, Aiϕ
is true at state s iff ϕ ∈ Ai(s). When the agents’ awareness
consists of all formulas built from a subset of atoms (the
so-called propositional awareness), we can simply associate
with a formula ϕ the set of atoms Q ⊆ P occurring in ϕ, and
we can then say that Aiϕ is true at state s iff Q ⊆ Ai(s).
This definition of explicit knowledge can lead to counter-
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intuitive situations. Consider the following models.
M : ◦ ◦ ◦
s t u
M ′ : ◦ ◦ •
s t u
Model M has a domain {s, t, u}, a single agent i with acces-
sibility relation R = {(s, t), (t, u)}, atom p true in all states,
and the agent is aware of p only in state s. Awareness is not
depicted. Model M ′ is like M , except that p is now false in
u (the black dot).
As mentioned, the agent knows explicitly a given ϕ at
a given state iff she is aware of the formula in that state
and ϕ is true in all accessible states. Let us apply this to
the depicted structures. In both, the agent is unaware of p
at state t, and therefore of the value of p in u: she should
see (M, t) and (M ′, t) as identical, and therefore (M, s) and
(M ′, s) as well. We propose a notion of bisimilarity for which
(M, s) and (M ′, s) are bisimilar.
Now here is the surprise: in the language with awareness
and modal box, states (M, s) and (M ′, s) are not modally
equivalent. Given explicit knowledge KEi ϕ as iϕ ∧ Aiϕ,
consider KEi ip. This is true in (M, s) but false in (M
′, s).
In logics of awareness [4] it is common only to consider
models for knowledge (equivalence relations) and belief. How-
ever, as always in multi-agent logics, it is elementary to
transform a single-agent model with directed (asymmetric)
accessibility into a multi-agent model where intersecting equiv-
alence classes for agents force such asymmetry. For example,
consider the following.
T : ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
w s t u
i j i
T ′ : ◦ ◦ ◦ •
w s t u
i j i
Models T and T ′ have equivalence accessibility relations (a
line represents a two-directions arrow, with reflexive and
transitive arrows omitted) for agents i and j. Agent i is
aware of p in the states w, and unaware of p in every other
state; agent j is unaware of p in every state. The only differ-
ence between T and T ′ is that p is true at (T, u) and false in
(T ′, u). Again, intuitively, these models are the same from
agent i’s perspective. But KEi jip is true above and false
below.
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The problem here is the presence of the . If the KE op-
erator is not defined by abbreviation but a primitive in the
language, then the models cannot be distinguished, as we
will prove. Explicit possibility LE seems another desirable
primitive, as it is not the dual of explicit knowledge (both
require awareness). This led us to the comparison of logics
where different epistemic notions are primitive. Instead of
KE and LE as primitives, it turns out that we can equally
well take KE and A (awareness) as primitive, and this lan-
guage then contrasts nicely with the initial one with  and
A as primitives. A third epistemic notion is also in our fo-
cus: speculative knowledge KS [20, 21], and with that, the
language with KS and A. An agent i speculatively knows ϕ,
KSi ϕ, if in any i-accessible state, in any state indistinguish-
able from that as far as awareness of i is concerned, ϕ is
true. This is exactly the sense in which (M, s) and (M ′, s′),
or (T,w) and (T ′, w), are similar for i.
Our results. This paper addresses the question of what
a proper notion of knowledge should be in the presence
of awareness, and what the proper notion of bisimulation
should be in structures encoding knowledge and awareness;
how these choices interact; and how adding dynamics of
knowledge and awareness further affects this. We present
two notions of bisimulation for the Fagin and Halpern struc-
tures of [4], standard bisimulation and awareness bisimula-
tion; and we present three logics, all in the presence of oper-
ators Aiϕ for awareness of variables occurring in ϕ: the logic
of implicit knowledge (with i, so that K
E
i is definable), the
logic of explicit knowledge (with KEi ), and the logic of specu-
lative knowledge (with KSi ), summarily introduced above as
knowledge modulo speculation over unaware variables. We
then show that, on image-finite models, standard bisimilar-
ity corresponds to modal equivalence in the logic of implicit
knowledge, but that awareness bisimilarity corresponds to
modal equivalence in the logic of explicit knowledge, and also
to modal equivalence in the logic of speculative knowledge.
We continue by listing various expressivity results, mainly
that the logic of implicit knowledge is (strictly) more expres-
sive than the logic of explicit knowledge (reminiscent of [9]).
After that we give axiomatizations for our three logics. The
logic of implicit knowledge was already axiomatized in [4]
and the logic of explicit knowledge in [9], but the axiomati-
zation for the logic of speculative knowledge is novel. Then
we investigate the dynamics of awareness and of knowledge,
by way of epistemic awareness action models. The dynamic
logic of speculative knowledge has already been reported in
[22]. Here, we show that on the class of finite models ev-
ery conceivable change of (implicit, explicit, or speculative)
knowledge or awareness can be modelled in an epistemic
awareness action model. Finally, we give a complete axiom-
atization for the dynamic logic of implicit knowledge. The
dynamic versions of the logics are, surprising, equally expres-
sive. This also gives us the axiomatization for the dynamic
logic of explicit knowledge.
Overview of the literature. Our work is rooted in the tra-
dition of epistemic logic [13] and in particular multi-agent
epistemic logic [15, 5], in various works on the interaction
between awareness and knowledge [4, 16, 9, 11, 12, 8, 10],
and in modal logical research in propositional quantification,
starting with [6] and followed up by work on bisimulation
quantifiers [24, 14, 7].
Works treating awareness either follow a more semanti-
cally flavoured approach, where awareness is defined in terms
of a set of propositional variables [17, 11], or a more syn-
tactically flavoured approach, where awareness concerns all
formulas of the language in a given set, in order to model
‘limited rationality’ of agents [4, 19]. Our proposal falls
straight into the semantic corner: within the limits of their
awareness, agents are fully rational.
2. LOGICS FOR AWARENESS
Throughout the contribution, given are a countable non-
empty set of atomic propositions P and a (disjoint) finite
non-empty set of agents N .
Definition 1 (Epistemic awareness model) An episte-
mic awareness model is a tuple M = (S,R,A, V ) where
• S (also denoted by D(M)) is a non-empty set of states;
• R : N → P(S × S) is an accessibility function;
• A : N → S → P(P ) is an awareness function;
• V : P → P(S) is a valuation.
A pair (M, s) with s ∈ S is an epistemic awareness state.
We write Ri for R(i), Ai for A(i), and Ri(s) for {t ∈ S |
Ri(s, t)}. An epistemic awareness model is image-finite if all
Ri(s) are finite.
An epistemic awareness model is simply an epistemic model
plus a propositional awareness function. We associate two
notions of bisimulation [18, 3] with this. Standard bisimula-
tion is the more obvious one, but awareness bisimulation is
evidently the more suitable notion in view of our introduc-
tory examples. The motivation for awareness bisimulation
was the lattice of state spaces in [11]; see [20, 21] for details.
Definition 2 (Standard bisimulation) Let Q ⊆ P . A Q
standard bisimulation between epistemic awareness models
M = (S,R,A, V ) and M ′ = (S′, R′,A′, V ′) is a relation
R[Q] ⊆ (S × S′) such that, for every (s, s′) ∈ R[Q], for
every agent i ∈ N , and for every p ∈ Q:
• atoms: s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
• aware: Q ∩ Ai(s) = Q ∩ A′i(s′);
• forth: if t ∈ Ri(s) then there is a t′ ∈ R′i(s′) such that
(t, t′) ∈ R[Q];
• back: if t′ ∈ R′i(s′) then there is a t ∈ Ri(s) such that
(t, t′) ∈ R[Q].
(M, s) and (M ′, s′) are Q standard bisimilar, notation (M, s)
Q (M ′, s′), if there is a Q standard bisimulation between
M and M ′ that contains (s, s′).
Definition 3 (Awareness bisimulation) As Definition 2
but with the following clauses for forth and back instead.
• forth: if t ∈ Ri(s) then there is a t′ ∈ R′i(s′) such that
(t, t′) ∈ R[Q ∩ Ai(s)];
• back: if t′ ∈ R′i(s′) then there is a t ∈ Ri(s) such that
(t, t′) ∈ R[Q ∩ A′i(s′)].
where R[Q∩Ai(s)] is a Q∩Ai(s) awareness bisimulation and
R[Q ∩ A′i(s′)] is a Q ∩ A′i(s′) awareness bisimulation. The
notation for Q awareness bisimilarity is (M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′).
In an awareness bisimulation, the perspective of the agent
is restricted to the variables that she is aware of, therefore
in the back and forth steps bisimulation is only checked for
the variables in Q∩Ai(s) instead of the variables in Q. The
following is therefore obvious.
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Proposition 4 Let (M, s) and (M ′, s′) be epistemic aware-
ness models, and Q ⊆ P . If (M, s) Q (M ′, s′), then
(M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′).
Example 1 Awareness bisimularity does not imply stan-
dard bisimularity. The epistemic awareness states (M, s)
and (M ′, s) of the introduction are {p} awareness bisimilar.
To see this, observe that (M,u) and (M ′, u′) are ∅ aware-
ness bisimilar; then, because of this, because {p}∩Ai(t) = ∅
and because t’s states coincide in p’s truth value and in
i’s awareness of p, epistemic awareness states (M, t) and
(M ′, t′) are {p} awareness bisimilar. In turn, this, the fact
that {p} ∩ Ai(s) = {p} and the fact that s and s′ coincide
in p’s truth value and in i’s awareness of p, make epistemic
awareness states (M, s) and (M ′, s′) {p} awareness bisimilar
too.
However, (M, s) and (M ′, s) are not {p} standard bisimi-
lar because, in turn, (M, t) and (M ′, t) are not {p} standard
bisimilar, and this is because (M,u) and (M ′, u) are not {p}
standard bisimilar: they differ in p’s truth-value.
Definition 5 (Language) The language L(,KE , LE , KS ,
A) is defined as follows, where p ∈ P and i ∈ N .
ϕ ::=  | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | iϕ | KEi ϕ | LEi ϕ | KSi ϕ | Aiϕ
Given a language L, L|Q is the language with the proposi-
tional variables restricted to Q ⊆ P .
We typically consider languages for subsets of these induc-
tive rules. We write L for L(, A), LE for L(KE , A), and
LS for L(KS , A), as these three languages are the main fo-
cus of our investigations. We assume familiarity with the
meaning of propositional constructs, the modal box, and
awareness. Implication →, disjunction ∨, equivalence ↔,
and the modal diamond i are defined by abbreviation, as
usual. Formula iϕ sometimes stands for ‘the agent im-
plicitly knows ϕ’, but we also view it as a mere technical
background notion. Formula KEi ϕ stands for ‘the agent ex-
plicitly knows that ϕ, LEi ϕ stands for ‘the agent explicitly
considers possible that ϕ. (Explicit knowledge is not the
dual of explicit possibility, as both require awareness.) For-
mula KSi ϕ stands for ‘the agent speculatively knows that ϕ.
Speculative possibility LSi ϕ is the dual of speculative knowl-
edge and by abbreviation defined as LSi ϕ iff ¬KSi ¬ϕ. More
explanations will be given with the semantics.
Definition 6 (Free variables) The free variables of a for-
mula ϕ are defined by v(p) := {p}, v(¬ϕ) := v(ϕ), v(ϕ ∧
ψ) := v(ϕ) ∪ v(ψ) and v(Y ϕ) := v(ϕ), where Y is one of
i, Ai,K
E
i , L
E
i ,K
S
i .
Definition 7 (Semantics) Let (M, s) be an epistemic aware-
ness state, with M = (S,R,A, V ). The non-propositional
clauses are
(M, s) |= iϕ iff ∀t ∈ Ri(s), (M, t) |= ϕ
(M, s) |= Aiϕ iff v(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s)
(M, s) |= KEi ϕ iff v(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s) and ∀t ∈ Ri(s), (M, t) |= ϕ
(M, s) |= LEi ϕ iff v(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s) and ∃t ∈ Ri(s), (M, t) |= ϕ
(M, s) |= KSi ϕ iff ∀t ∈ Ri(s), ∀(M ′, t′)↔Ai(s)(M, t),
(M ′, t′) |= ϕ
Model validity M |= ϕ and validity |= ϕ are defined as usual.
The logic (i.e., the set of validities) of language L is called
L, the logic of LE is LE, and the logic of LS is LS.
We will refer to our standard logics as follows:
• L: the logic of implicit knowledge
• LE : the logic of explicit knowledge
• LS : the logic of speculative knowledge
We pay attention to semantic relations between the non-
propositional primitives in Section 5. E.g., it is the case
that Aiϕ ↔ (KEi ϕ ∨ LEi ¬ϕ).
Speculative knowledge is defined in terms of awareness
bisimulation: agent i knows speculatively ϕ at (M, s) iff ϕ
is the case in every epistemic awareness state that is Ai(s)
awareness bisimilar to some state t accessible from s in M .
Speculative and explicit knowledge are different. For ex-
ample, any agent knows p ∨ ¬p speculatively, even if she is
unaware of p, because in every possible state p ∨ ¬p is true.
Nevertheless, the agent only knows p ∨ ¬p explicitly when
she is aware of p.
Speculative and implicit knowledge are also different. The
agent may implicitly know p, but she cannot speculatively
know that, because she can speculate about p being false.
And if p were false, she cannot know that p.
More convincing examples of speculative knowledge in-
volve dynamics. Suppose that the agent explicitly knows q
but is unaware of p. She then speculatively knows: “If p is
false then even if I were to become aware of p I cannot ex-
plicitly know that p and q are both true.” (In the extended
logic of Section 7 this is formally ¬p → [A+p]¬KEi (p ∧ q),
where [A+p] is a dynamic modal operator.) But she does
not explicitly know that, because she is unaware of p, and p
occurs in the formula. For more intuitions, see [20, 21, 22].
Definition 8 (Modal equivalence) Awareness epistemic
states (M, s) and (M ′, s′) are modally equivalent in a lan-
guage L up to Q ⊆ P , notation (M, s) ≡LQ (M ′, s′), if for all
ϕ ∈ L|Q, (M, s) |= ϕ iff (M ′, s′) |= ϕ. For L = L,LE ,LS
we write for that, respectively, ≡Q, ≡EQ, and ≡SQ.
Example 2 Consider the first introductory example. The
formula KEi ip is true in (M, s) and false in (M
′, s). The
models are not modally equivalent in the logic L. But they
are modally equivalent in the logic LE (without ), as we
will show later.
3. BISIMILARITY AND MODAL EQUIVA-
LENCE
For the logic of implicit knowledge we have, as expected,
that standard bisimilarity implies modal equivalence in L.
Moreover, in the class of image-finite models, modal equiv-
alence in L implies standard bisimilarity. (Let (M, s) and
(M ′, s′) be epistemic awareness models, and Q ⊆ P ...)
Proposition 9
(M, s) Q (M ′, s′) implies (M, s) ≡Q (M ′, s′).
Proof. The proof is standard, by induction on ϕ. The
case for formulas of the form Aiϕ follows from the aware
clause in Definition 2.
Proposition 10 On image-finite models:
(M, s) ≡Q (M ′, s′) implies (M, s) Q (M ′, s′).
Proof. Again, the proof is standard. For proving the
aware clause, we use modal equivalence with respect to for-
mulas of the form Aiϕ.
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Theorem 11 On image-finite models:
(M, s) Q (M ′, s′) iff (M, s) ≡Q (M ′, s′).
For the logic of explicit knowledge the correspondence is
between awareness bisimulation and modal equivalence in
LE . We recall that awareness bisimulation is a weaker notion
than standard bisimulation.
Proposition 12
(M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′) implies (M, s) ≡EQ (M ′, s′).
Proof. We show the following:
Let ϕ ∈ LE and let Q ⊆ P such that v(ϕ) ⊆ Q.
Then for any (M, s) and (M ′, s′), (M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′)
implies that: (M, s) |= ϕ iff (M ′, s′) |= ϕ.
In this formulation it is important that ϕ is chosen before Q,
and both ϕ and Q before the models, so that the inductive
hypothesis may be used on a subformula of ϕ for another
subset of P than the initial Q (and for any models). Again,
the proof goes by induction on ϕ; all cases are trivial except
KEi ϕ.
Case KEi Assume (M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′), and suppose that
(M, s) |= KEi ϕ with v(KEi ϕ) ⊆ Q (which implies v(ϕ) ⊆
Q). By semantic interpretation, v(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s) and every
state in Ri(s) satisfies ϕ. First, take any t
′ ∈ R′i(s′). By
back there is a t ∈ Ri(s) such that (M, t)↔Q∩Ai(s)(M ′, t′).
But t ∈ Ri(s) so (M, t) |= ϕ. Moreover, v(ϕ) ⊆ Q and
v(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s) so v(ϕ) ⊆ Q ∩ Ai(s), and then we can use
induction hypothesis to get (M ′, t′) |= ϕ. Thus, every ele-
ment of R′i(s
′) satisfies ϕ. Second, (M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′) implies
Q ∩ Ai(s) = Q ∩ A′i(s′), so from v(ϕ) ⊆ Q ∩ Ai(s) we get
v(ϕ) ⊆ Q ∩ A′i(s′) and thus v(ϕ) ⊆ A′i(s′). Hence, from
the two parts we get (M ′, s′) |= KEi ϕ, as needed. The other
direction is similar.
Proposition 13 On image-finite models:
(M, s) ≡EQ (M ′, s′) implies (M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′).
Proof. We will show that the relation of modal equiv-
alence in LE with formulas built from atoms in Q is a Q
awareness bisimulation, i.e., that ≡EQ satisfies Definition 3.
Suppose that (M, s) ≡EQ (M ′, s′).
• Atoms. Take any p ∈ Q and suppose s ∈ V (p); then p ∈
LE |Q and (M, s) |= p so (M ′, s′) |= p, that is, s′ ∈ V ′(p).
The other direction is similar.
• Aware. Take any i ∈ N , and suppose p ∈ Q∩Ai(s); then
p ∈ Q and p ∈ Ai(s). From the latter we get (M, s) |= Aip
and therefore (M ′, s′) |= Aip, that is, p ∈ A′i(s′). We
already had p ∈ Q, so p ∈ Q∩A′i(s′). The other direction
is similar.
• Forth. Take any i ∈ N , and suppose t ∈ Ri(s); we want
to find a t′ ∈ R′i(s′) such that (M, t) ≡EQ∩Ai(s) (M ′, t′).
We proceed by contradiction, so suppose no element of
R′i(s
′) is modally equivalent to t with respect to formulas
in LE |(Q ∩ Ai(s)).
Observe how R′i(s
′) is a finite non-empty set: finite be-
cause of image-finiteness, and non-empty because Ri(s) =
∅ iff (M, s) |= Li, and since Li ∈ LE |Q, we should
have (M ′, s′) |= Li too. Now, since no element of R′i(s′)
is modally equivalent to t with respect to formulas with
atoms in Q∩Ai(s), then for each t′k ∈ R′i(s′) there should
be a formula ϕk ∈ LE |(Q∩Ai(s)) that holds at t but fails
at t′k.
Now define ϕ := ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn (with n the cardinality of
R′i(s
′)). We have (M, t) |= ϕ because every ϕk is true
at t, but also (M ′, t′k) |= ϕ for every k because each ϕk
fails in at least t′k. Moreover, since ϕk ∈ LE |(Q ∩ Ai(s))
for every k, we have ϕ ∈ LE |(Q ∩ Ai(s)), and hence
v(ϕ) ⊆ Q ∩ Ai(s), that is, v(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s). Now, from
t ∈ Ri(s), (M, t) |= ϕ and v(ϕ) ⊆ Ai(s) we get (M, s) |=
Liϕ. But (M, s) |= Liϕ because no successor of s′ satisfies
ϕ. Then, Liϕ distinguishes between s and s
′. But since
ϕ ∈ LE |(Q ∩ Ai(s)), we have Liϕ ∈ LE |(Q ∩ Ai(s)) and
hence Liϕ ∈ LE |Q: this contradicts (M, s) ≡EQ (M ′, s′).
Hence, there should be a state t′ ∈ R′i(s′) such that
(M, t) ≡EQ∩Ai(s) (M ′, t′).
• Back. Similar to the forth clause.
Theorem 14 On image-finite models:
(M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′) iff (M, s) ≡EQ (M ′, s′).
Example 3 The formula KEi ip distinguishing the models
in the introduction is in L (it is an abbreviation of Aiip∧
iip), but it is not in LE. It was unclear until now that it
does not have an LE equivalent. Now it is clear: the models
(M, s) and (M ′, s′) are p awareness bisimilar, and therefore
modally equivalent in LE.
That the language L of implicit knowledge is aligned
with standard bisimulation rather than awareness bisimu-
lation can be seen as a strong argument against the use of
this language to specify interactions in epistemic awareness
models: it is too rich from the point of view of an agent rea-
soning about its knowledge and awareness. The language of
explicit knowledge LE can be seen as its ‘explicit’ counter-
part. Without the aspect of awareness, L is nothing but
the standard multiagent epistemic language, built from the
propositional connectives plus operators to talk about what
the agent knows and considers possible. Similarly, language
LE can be seen as (relative to an expressivity result proved
in Section 5) built from propositional connectives plus op-
erators to talk about what the agent explicitly knows and
explicitly considers possible.
Finally, speculative knowledge. Interestingly, modal equiv-
alence in LS for the logic of speculative knowledge is also
characterized (on image-finite models) by awareness bisim-
ulation.
Proposition 15
(M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′) implies (M, s) ≡SQ (M ′, s′).
Proof. See [21, 22].
Proposition 16 On image-finite models:
(M, s) ≡SQ (M ′, s′) implies (M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′).
Proof. Assume (M, s) ≡SQ (M ′, s′); we will show that
the relation ≡SQ defines a Q awareness bisimulation linking
(M, s) and (M ′, s′). Clauses atoms and aware are straight-
forward; back is similar to forth.
• Forth. We proceed as in Proposition 13. Assume that
t ∈ Ri(s), that the i-successors of t are t′1, . . . , t′m (a fi-
nite number), and that none of those is Q∩Ai(s) modally
equivalent to t. Therefore there are difference formulas
ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ LS |(Q ∩ Ai(s)) that are false in t′1, . . . , t′m,
respectively, and true in t, so that their conjunction ψ =∧
1..m ϕi is true in t. This conjunction ψ is also in LS |(Q∩
Ai(s)). We now have that (M, s) |= LSi ψ, as there is an
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i-accessible state from s, namely t, and a Q∩Ai(s) aware-
ness bisimilar state equivalent to (M, t), namely (M, t) it-
self, such that (M, t) |= ψ. (From (M, t) ≡Q∩Ai(s) (M, t)
follows by the definition of the bisimulation that (t, t) ∈
R[Q ∩ Ai(s)].) On the other hand, LSi ψ is false in s′:
clearly, ψ is false in any of the states t′1, . . . , t
′
m accessible
from s′, but any Q∩Ai(s) modally equivalent state should
also not satisfy ψ, as ψ ∈ LS |(Q ∩ Ai(s)).
Theorem 17 On image-finite models:
(M, s)↔Q(M ′, s′) iff (M, s) ≡SQ (M ′, s′).
4. HAVING THE SAME KNOWLEDGE
We can now harvest the benefits from the previous sec-
tion. We want to characterize when two epistemic awareness
states are the same ‘from the perspective of an agent’, that
is, when the agent’s knowledge and ignorance is the same in
both. This is weaker than being modally equivalent: two ep-
istemic awareness states (M, s) and (M ′, s′) that differ only
in a propositional variable p look the same for an agent that
is not aware of p in both, and they also look the same for
an agent that is aware of p in both but such that the actual
state is not accessible. The results for implicit, explicit and
speculative knowledge are similar.
Definition 18 (Same knowledge) Let Q ⊆ P , and N ′ ⊆
N . Assume epistemic awareness states (M, s) and (M ′, s′).
• (M, s) and (M ′, s′) describe the same implicit knowledge
up to Q for the agents in N ′ iff, for every agent i ∈ N ′
and every formula ϕ ∈ L|Q, (M, s) |= iϕ iff (M ′, s′) |=
iϕ.
• (M, s) and (M ′, s′) describe the same explicit knowledge
up to Q for the agents in N ′ iff, for every agent i ∈ N ′ and
every formula ϕ ∈ LE |Q, (M, s) |= KEi ϕ iff (M ′, s′) |=
KEi ϕ, and (M, s) |= LEi ϕ iff (M ′, s′) |= LEi ϕ.
• (M, s) and (M ′, s′) describe the same speculative knowl-
edge up to Q for the agents in N ′ iff, for every agent
i ∈ N and every formula ϕ ∈ LS, (M, s) |= KSi ϕ iff
(M ′, s′) |= KSi ϕ.
If (M, s) and (M ′, s′) describe the same explicit knowledge
for agent i up to (at least) Ai(s), and Ai(s) = A′i(s′), then
we can simply say that they describe the same explicit knowl-
edge for agent i; and similarly for speculative knowledge.
To define the same explicit knowledge, we need to refer to
both KE and LE in the definition (both require awareness).
For implicit knowledge and for speculative knowledge the
part for the dual diamond version is simply the contrapo-
sition of the part for the box version. The ‘at least’ bit in
the final part of the definition is there, because agent i does
not explicitly know any formula with variables in Q \Ai(s),
both in s and s′.
Write (M, s)↔i(M ′, s′) whenever (M, s)↔Ai(s)(M ′, s′) ex-
cept for the valuation of atoms in s and s′ (i.e., skip clause
atoms in the root), and except for back and forth for all
other agents than i, in the root. Then this ↔i equivalence
class encodes exactly ‘what agent i knows in state s’. This
works both for explicit knowledge and for speculative knowl-
edge (for implicit knowledge we would require standard bi-
simulation, but we consider that case of lesser interest).
Proposition 19 Let (M, s) and (M ′, s′) be image-finite ep-
istemic awareness models, and i ∈ N . Then (M, s)↔i(M ′, s′)
iff (M, s) and (M ′, s′) describe the same explicit / specula-
tive knowledge for agent i.
Proof. Directly from Theorem 14, resp., Theorem 17.
This structural characterization of explicit knowledge and
speculative knowledge, for a given agent, was an important
motivation for our investigation.
5. EXPRESSIVITY
Two models (M, s) and (M ′, s′) can be distinguished in
language L of logic L if there is formula ϕ ∈ L that is false
in (M, s) and true in (M ′, s′); ϕ is called a distinguishing
formula. A logic L with language L is at least as expressive
as L′ with language L′ if all pairs of models distinguishable
in L′ are also distinguishable in L. A standard way to prove
this, is to show that any formula in L′ is equivalent to a
formula in L (and a trivial case is when L′ ⊆ L), and a
standard way to disprove it is to show that some pair of
models distinguishable in L′ is indistinguishable in L. A
logic L is (strictly) more expressive than a language L′, given
a class of models, if L is at least as expressive as L′ but not
vice versa. Instead of expressivity of logics one sometimes
talks about the expressivity of languages. The latter is then,
of course, relative to a semantics, i.e., it concerns after all a
logic.
The expressivity hierarchy is a partial order <. We are
interested in the relative expressivity of our main logics L,
LE , and LS . This is a total order: L > LE = LS . Both
terms in the equation are of interest. For example, LE and
LS could just as well have been incomparable. Of further in-
terest is that a number of other logics are equally expressive
as L. As we have a good naming device for languages but
not for logics we will henceforth in this section talk about
expressivity of languages, not logics, and we will write all
languages in full, e.g., L(, A) instead of L, etc.
Proposition 20 (Equivalence class of L)
The languages L(, A), L(,KE), L(,KE , A) and L(,
KE , LE) are equally expressive.
Proof. This follows from the following equivalences:
KEi ϕ ⇔ iϕ ∧Aiϕ
LEi ϕ ⇔ iϕ ∧Aiϕ
Aiϕ ⇔ KEi ϕ ∨ LEi ¬ϕ ⇔ KEi (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
Proposition 21 (Equivalence class of LE)
The languages L(KE , LE), L(KE , A), L(KE) and L(LE , A)
are equally expressive.
Proof. This follows from the following equivalences:
KEi ϕ ⇔ ¬LEi ¬ϕ ∧Aiϕ
LEi ϕ ⇔ ¬KEi ¬ϕ ∧Aiϕ
Aiϕ ⇔ KEi ϕ ∨ LEi ¬ϕ ⇔ KEi (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)
Proposition 22 (L > LE)
L(, A) is more expressive than L(KE , A).
Proof. Consider the models (M, s) and (M, s′) of the
first introductory example. We have seen that they are {p}
awareness bisimilar, and thus by Proposition 12 modally
equivalent in L(KE , A). On the other hand, KEi ip ∈ L(,
A) distinguishes between the two models. Hence, L(, A) is
more expressive than L(KE , A).
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Proposition 23 (Equivalence class of LE, continued)
L(KS , A) and L(KE , A) are equally expressive.
Proof. To show that L(KS , A) is at least as expressive
L(KE , A) it is enough to show that KE and LE are express-
ible in L(KS , A). The following obvious (recursive) defini-
tions are sufficient for this.
(KEi ϕ)
′ def≡ KSi ϕ′ ∧Aiϕ (LEi ϕ)′
def≡ LSi ϕ′ ∧Aiϕ
For the converse, to show that L(KE , A) is at least as ex-
pressive as L(KS , A), we require the concept of a uniform
interpolant [24]. It has been shown that the modal logic K
has the uniform interpolation property, that is, if there is a
formula ϕ whose variables are taken from the union of the
disjoint sets of atoms Q and R, then there is a single formula
ϕQ such that
1. ϕ → ϕQ is valid.
2. the validity of ϕ → γ implies the validity of ϕQ → γ
for all formulae γ not containing any atoms from R.
This allows us to define a recursive translation (relative to
the set Q of propositional atoms the agent is aware of):
(KSi ϕ)
′ def≡Q (KEi ϕ′)Q (LSi ϕ)′
def≡Q (LEi ϕ′)Q
The proof of Prop. 23 required the presence of the aware-
ness operator in L(KS , A) (but not that of A in L(KE , A),
given Prop. 21). As speculative knowledge treats unaware
atoms as their most general consistent interpretation, there
is no semantic difference (with respect to just speculative
knowledge) between an agent being unaware of an atom and
an agent (speculatively) knowing nothing about it.
The lower end of this expressivity hierarchy is also of the-
oretical interest but maybe less of practical interest. We
have various other results, that are given here without proof.
Clearly the propositional language L(∅) is less expressive
than all of L(KE), L(LE), L(), and L(KS). More inter-
esting is that, although we already established that L(KE)
is equally expressive as L(KE , A), still, L(), L(LE) and
L(KS) are strictly less expressive than, respectively, L(, A),
L(LE , A) and L(KS , A). Interestingly, L() and L(KS) are
incomparable. And so on . . .
6. AXIOMATIZATION
In this section we present complete axiomatizations for
our logics.
Table 1 presents an axiomatization L characterizing the
validities of the language L in epistemic awareness mod-
els (the logic L). This axiomatization is provided in [4],
modulo a minor variation (see Section 8).
All propositional tautologies Ai
 Ai¬ϕ ↔ Aiϕ
i(ϕ → ψ) → (iϕ → iψ) Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ Aiϕ ∧Aiψ
From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ Aijϕ ↔ Aiϕ
From ϕ infer iϕ AiAjϕ ↔ Aiϕ
Table 1: Axiom system L
Theorem 24 (Soundness and completeness)
Axiom system L is sound and complete for L with respect
to epistemic awareness models.
Proof. Soundness is proved by showing that axioms in
L are valid and that its rules preserve validity. Complete-
ness is proved by using the canonical model technique in the
standard way.
Table 2 presents an axiomatization LE characterizing the
validities of the language LE in epistemic awareness models.
A similar axiomatization, but with a different completeness
proof, was provided in [9]. See again Section 8 for further
discussion.
All propositional tautologies Ai
 Ai¬ϕ ↔ Aiϕ
KEi (ϕ → ψ) → (KEi ϕ → KEi ψ) Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ Aiϕ ∧Aiψ
KEi ϕ → Aiϕ AiKEj ϕ ↔ Aiϕ
From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ AiAjϕ ↔ Aiϕ
From ϕ infer Aiϕ → KEi ϕ
Table 2: Axiom system LE
Theorem 25 (Soundness and completeness)
Axiom system LE is sound and complete for LE with respect
to epistemic awareness models.
Proof. Soundness is proved by showing that axioms in
LE are valid and that its rules preserve validity. Complete-
ness is proved by using the canonical model technique in the
standard way.
Table 3 presents an axiomatization LS characterizing the
validities of the language LS in epistemic awareness models.
In axiom * of Table 3, calledKS, it is required that p ∈ v(ϕ).
All propositional tautologies Ai
 Ai¬ϕ ↔ Aiϕ
KSi (ϕ → ψ) → (KSi ϕ → KSi ψ) Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ Aiϕ ∧Aiψ
KSi ϕ → (¬Aip → KSi ϕ[p\ψ]) * AiKSj ϕ ↔ Aiϕ
From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ AiAjϕ ↔ Aiϕ
From ϕ infer KSi ϕ
Table 3: Axiom system LS
Since the axiomatization for the logic of speculative knowl-
edge is novel, we provide the results in detail.
Theorem 26 (Soundness) Every theorem of LS is valid.
Proof. This is a quite standard proof, and we only need
to examine the axioms and rules involving speculative knowl-
edge. Axiom KSi (ϕ → ψ) → (KSi ϕ → KSi ψ) and the rule of
necessitation for KS are straightforward, and are also found
in [21].
Axiom KS is new. It says that if an agent speculatively
knows a formula despite the formula using an atom of which
the agent is unaware, then the agent would continue to know
that formula if the atom were replaced with any other for-
mula. This axiom captures the intuition of the specula-
tive knowledge operator, where if an agent is unaware of an
atom, the agent must assume the most general interpreta-
tion of that atom. In other words, this is according to the
semantics for speculative knowledge.
To prove completeness, we use the canonical model tech-
nique.
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Definition 27 (Canonical model) The canonical model
for LS is a tuple Mc = (Sc, Rc,Ac, V c) where
• Sc is the set of all theories (maximal consistent sets) of
LS;
• For any i ∈ N , Rci is a binary relation on Sc such that
Rci (Φ,Ψ) iff for all ϕ, K
S
i ϕ ∈ Φ implies ϕ ∈ Ψ;
• Ac : N → Sc → P is such that p ∈ Aci (Φ) iff Aip ∈ Φ;
• V c : P → Sc is such that Φ ∈ V c(p) iff p ∈ Φ.
Lemma 28 For all formulas ϕ ∈ LS and all maximal con-
sistent sets Φ ∈ Sc, v(ϕ) ⊆ Aci (Φ) iff Aiϕ ∈ Φ.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of a ca-
nonical model (Definition 27) and the axioms involving aware-
ness (right-hand side of Table 3).
Lemma 29 Suppose that (M, s) is image-finite. Let Th(M, s)
be {ϕ ∈ LS | (M, s) |= ϕ}. Then (M, s)↔(Mc,Th(M, s)).
Proof. This follows from the definitions of the canonical
model (Def. 27) and awareness bisimulation (Def. 3). De-
fine the relation B = {(s,Th(M, s)) | s ∈ D(M)}. It can be
easily seen that B satisfies clauses atoms and aware. For
forth, if t ∈ Ri(s), then we have (t,Th(M, t)) ∈ B, and
we note that Th(M, t) ∈ Rci (Th(M, s)) since if (M, s) |=
KSi (ϕ), then (M, t) |= ϕ. For back, if Φ ∈ Rci (Th(M, s)),
then for every formula ϕ ∈ Φ we must have (M, s) |= LSi ϕ.
Since M is image-finite there must be some t ∈ Ri(s) such
that for all ϕ ∈ Φ, (M, t) |= ϕ. Therefore (t,Φ) ∈ B and we
are done.
Lemma 30 (Truth) For all formulas ϕ ∈ LS and all max-
imal consistent sets Φ ∈ Sc, (Mc,Φ) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Φ.
Proof Sketch. This is shown by induction over the com-
plexity of formulas; we only show the non-trivial case KSi ϕ.
Suppose (Mc,Φ) |= KSi ϕ. Then for all Ψ ∈ Rci (Φ) and
for all (N, t)↔Aci (Φ)(Mc,Ψ) we have (N, t) |= ϕ. Suppose
for contradiction that KSi ϕ /∈ Φ; then there must be some
Ψ ∈ Rci (Φ) such that ¬ϕ ∈ Ψ (this follows from the max-
imality of Φ, from propositional reasoning, and the axioms
for distribution of KS over → and necessitation for KS).
By induction hypothesis, (Mc,Ψ) |= ¬ϕ and, since aware-
ness bisimulation is reflexive, we have the required contra-
diction, so we must have KSi ϕ ∈ Φ.
Now suppose that KSi ϕ ∈ Φ and define Q := v(ϕ)\Aci (Φ).
From axiom KS we also have that
(
KSi ϕ ∧
∧
q∈Q
¬Aiq
)→ KSi ϕ[Q\ψ],
where ψ is any vector of formulas in one-to-one correspon-
dence with Q (so that [Q\ψ] stands for simultaneous substi-
tution). So KSi ϕ[Q\ψ] ∈ Φ. Now suppose that Ψ ∈ Rci (Φ),
and that (N, t) is any model such that (N, t)↔Ai(Φ)(Mc,Ψ).
By Theorem 26, Th(N, t) must be a maximally consis-
tent set. For every atom p ∈ Q, we define a characteristic
formula, χ(p),that is true exactly when p is in the sets reach-
able from Th(N, t), up to the modal depth of ϕ. This can be
done by taking the intersection of these sets with the closure
set of ϕ (all subformulas of ϕ and their negations) and the
set Aci (Φ). Applying axiom KS, substituting χ(p) for p we
can show that LSi ψ ∈ Φ for all ψ ⊆ ϕ where (N, t) |= ψ.
Since KSi ϕ ∈ Φ for every subtitution of Q, it follows that
(N, t) |= ϕ as required. Therefore, (Mc,Φ) |= KSi ϕ as re-
quired.
Theorem 31 (Completeness)
Let Φ ⊆ LS and ϕ ∈ LS. Then Φ |= ϕ implies Φ  ϕ.
7. DYNAMICS
7.1 Epistemic awareness action models
Epistemic awareness models represent the information of
agents who may be uncertain about the truth of some propo-
sitional variables and unaware of others. The information of
such agents can change via informational acts. Epistemic
awareness action models represent awareness change and
knowledge change. They were introduced in [22] for the logic
of speculative knowledge. The definition adds a component
for awareness to the action models of [1] (and a component
for postconditions, as in [23]).
Definition 32 (Epistemic awareness action model)
An epistemic awareness actionmodel is a tuple M = (S,R,A,
pre, post) where
• S is a non-empty set of actions;
• R : N → P(S× S) is an accessibility function;
• A : {+,−} → N → S → P(P ) is an awareness change
function, indicating the disjoint sets of atoms each agent
i ∈ N will become aware (+) and unaware of (-) after the
execution of s ∈ S;
• pre : S → L is a precondition function specifying, for each
action s ∈ S, the requirement for its execution;
• post : S → P → L is a postcondition function specify-
ing, for each action in s ∈ S, how the truth value of each
atomic proposition p ∈ P will change.
A pair (M, s) with s ∈ S is an epistemic awareness action.
The language L of the preconditions and postconditions is a
fixed parameter of this definition. We write A+i for A(+)(i)
and A−i for A(−)(i).
Example 4 Particular kinds of epistemic awareness action
models can be considered. Some examples:
• If A+ and A− are both empty, the standard action models
for knowledge change reappear.
• The singleton epistemic awareness action model with ac-
tion s accessible to all agents, with trivial precondition and
postcondition, and such that A+i (s) = {p} for all agents
i, represents ‘all agents become aware of p’ (without any
knowledge change). For this action we write A+p. (Simi-
larly, A−p, for becoming unaware of a variable.)
• The singleton epistemic awareness action model that is
similar to the previous, but with precondition ϕ and A+i (s) =
v(ϕ), represents a ‘public announcement of a novel issue
ϕ’ — all agents become aware of the variables in ϕ as part
of the announcement. For this action we write !Aϕ.
We can now indicate how an epistemic awareness action
model modifies an epistemic awareness model.
Definition 33 (Action model execution) Let M = (S,
R,A, V ) be an epistemic awareness model, and let M =
(S,R,A, pre, post) be an epistemic awareness action model.
The epistemic awareness model M ⊗M = (S′, R′,A′, V ′) –
the result of executing M in M – is defined as follows:
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S′ :=
{
(s, s) | (M, s) |= pre(s)}
R′i :=
{(
(s, s), (s′, s′)
) | s′ ∈ Ri(s) and (s, s′) ∈ Ri
}
A′i(s, s) :=
(Ai(s) ∪ A+i (s)
)\A−i (s)
V ′(p) :=
{
(s, s) | (M, s) |= post(s, p)}
The new set of states is the restricted cartesian product
of S and S: a pair (s, s) is a state in the new model iff s
satisfies s’s precondition in M . Since the precondition is a
formula of a language L, we assume a satisfiability relation
|= that evaluates it. For the accessibility relation of the new
model, we combine the accessibility relation of the ‘static’
model and the ‘action’ model: a state (s′, s′) is R′i-accessible
from state (s, s) iff s′ is Ri-accessible from s, and s′ is Ri-
accessible from s. For the awareness function of each agent i
in each state (s, s), we add to Ai(s) the atoms in A+i (s) and
remove those in A−i (s) (in whatever order, as these sets are
disjoint). For the valuation: an atomic proposition p is true
at state (s, s) iff s satisfies post(s, p) in M .
7.2 Language and semantics
Instead of interpreting action models relative to a given
logical language, we can also consider the set of action model
frames as an additional parameter in an inductively defined
language with a clause [M, s]ϕ (where the precondition of ac-
tions should be lower in the inductive hierarchy); this stands
for ‘after execution of (M, s), ϕ (is true)’.
Definition 34 (Language) The language L(⊗) extends any
L with an additional inductive clause [M, s]ϕ, where (M, s)
is an epistemic awareness action satisfying that: its domain
is finite, the postcondition function changes the valuation of
only a finite number of atomic propositions, and the aware-
ness function returns two finite sets of atomic propositions.
For L(, A,⊗) we write L⊗, for L(KE , A,⊗) we write
LE⊗, and L(KS , A,⊗) we write LS⊗.
Definition 35 (Free variables)
An additional inductive clause v([M, s]ϕ) is defined as
v(ϕ)∪
⋃
t∈D(M)
v(pre(t))∪
⋃
t∈D(M),p∈A+i (t)∪A
−
i (t)
(p∪v(post(t)(p)))
This definition of free variables formalizes that an agent is
aware of an action [M, s] if she is aware of all variables that
occur in a precondition or postcondition of an action in the
model M. This can be called a conservative stance. For
example, the agent can only be aware of ip → [A+p]KEi p
(if the agent implicitly knows ϕ, then after becoming aware
of p, the agent explicitly knows that p) if the agent is already
aware of p before the action. There is much wiggle room here
that may also depend on philosophical considerations. For
example, alternatively one could call a variable p that occurs
in a construct [A+p]KEi p a closed variable. The variables
that an agent is aware of now would then exclude those that
she may become aware of later. We think this stance is
conceptually problematic.
Definition 36 (Semantics)
Let M = (S,R,A, V ) and s ∈ S.
(M, s) |= [M, s]ϕ iff (M, s) |= pre(s) ⇒ (M ⊗M, (s, s)) |= ϕ
The set of validities of language LX⊗ is called the logic LX⊗
(for X = , E, S).
Example 5 The dynamic operator [M, s] is not awareness
bisimulation preserving. Consider this: The models (M, s)
and (M ′, s) of the introduction are p awareness bisimilar.
And modally equivalent in LE. But after we make the agent
aware of p, they are no longer p awareness bisimilar. The
formula KEi K
E
i p is now a distinguishing formula. And there-
fore, [A+p]KEi K
E
i p is true in (M, s) and false in (M
′, s). So
(M, s) and (M ′, s) are not modally equivalent in LE⊗.
The dynamic operator [M, s] is not awareness bisimulation
preserving, but it is standard bisimulation preserving. The
proof is similar for all three dynamic logics. In the proof
we use modal equivalence in LX⊗ (for X = E,S, of epi-
stemic awareness states up to Q, denoted by ≡X⊗Q , defined
analogously to ≡XQ .
Proposition 37 Let ϕ ∈ LX⊗, Q ⊆ P , and (M, s), (M ′, s′)
given. If (M, s) Q (M ′, s′), then (M, s) ≡X⊗Q (M ′, s′).
Proof. The proof is very similar to that in [22] for spec-
ulative knowledge. (Theorem 8 in [22] contains an error. It
is here corrected.) The difference between implicit, specu-
lative and explicit knowledge plays no role in the inductive
case for action models. We only show that case.
Inductive case [M, s]ϕ: Suppose (M, s) |= [M, s]ϕ.
Then (M, s) |= pre(s) implies (M ⊗ M, (s, s)) |= ϕ. By in-
duction, (M, s) |= pre(s) iff (M ′, s′) |= pre(s). The modal
product construction in (M ⊗M) is (standard) bisimulation
preserving [1]; an easily observable fact when one realizes
that pairs in the new accessibility relation require the first
argument to be in the accessibility relation in the original
model (given (t, t′) ∈ R[Q], the induced bisimulation R′[Q]
on the product is defined as ((t, t), (t′, t)) ∈ R′[Q]). We now
also have to satisfy the aware requirement. In the model
M ⊗ M the level of awareness Ai(t, t) is a function of the
prior level of awareness Ai(t) in t and the added or deleted
propositional variables A+i (t) and A
−
i (t). As the prior aware-
ness Ai(t) is the same in any Q awareness bisimilar state t′,
and the added or deleted atoms are also the same, the poste-
rior awareness must therefore also be the same for any pairs
(t, t) and (t′, t) in the Q awareness bisimulation. Therefore,
(M ⊗ M, (s, s))↔Q(M ′ ⊗ M, (s′, s)). Now using induction
again, we conclude (M ′⊗M, (s′, s)) |= ϕ, and from that and
(M ′, s′) |= pre(s) we conclude (M ′, s′) |= [M, s]ϕ.
Given the variety of knowledge and awareness changes that
can be modelled by epistemic awareness action models, as
shown in Example 4, the following is an important theorem.
It demonstrates the adequacy of the framework.
Theorem 38 Let (M, s) and (M ′, s′) be finite epistemic
awareness states. Then there is an epistemic awareness ac-
tion (M, s) such that (M, s) ⊗ (M, s) is standardly bisimilar
to (M ′, s′).
Proof. The proof is an extension of the one in [23]. We
sketch the proof. First, delete the structure of (M, s) by a
public announcement of its characteristic formula (as M is
finite, this characteristic formula exists [2]). The result is a
singleton epistemic awareness state consisting of s only. It
does not matter what the valuation is or the level of aware-
ness because, next, we execute an epistemic awareness ac-
tion with precondition true and with the exact structure of
the target model (M ′, s′), using postconditions in actions
instead of valuations in states (setting then the value of
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propositional variables to the value of the valuation in the
corresponding state), and awareness change function in ac-
tions instead of awareness functions in states (setting then
the level of awareness of propositional variables to that in
the corresponding state). This last part on awareness is the
extension with respect to [23].
An alternative construction is the straightforward execu-
tion in (M, s) of an epistemic awareness action with the
structure of the target model (M ′, s′), and then the result is
an epistemic awareness state bisimilar to (M ′, s′) (but typ-
ically larger than in the previous construction, it now has
size |M ⊗M ′| instead of size |M ′|).
7.3 Axiomatization
We now give the axiomatization of the logic L⊗. In Table
4 we only give the axioms involving action models. The ones
for awareness after actions were presented in [22] and the
one for implicit knowledge after action is novel, but has the
standard shape of [1]. These are rewrite rules, that allow us
to eliminate epistemic awareness action from formulas (given
an innermost action model, one pushes it deeper and deeper
into a formula until one of the first two axioms can be applied
at which moment it has disappeared on the right-hand side).
This proves the completeness of the axiomatization and the
logic L⊗ is therefore also equally expressive as the logic of
implicit knowledge L.
[M, s] ↔ 
[M, s]p ↔ (pre(s) → post(s, p))
[M, s]¬ϕ ↔ (pre(s) → ¬[M, s]ϕ)
[M, s](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([M, s]ϕ ∧ [M, s]ψ)
[M, s]Aiϕ ↔ ¬pre(s) if v(Aiϕ) ∩ A−i (s) = ∅
[M, s]Aiϕ ↔ (pre(s) → Aiϕ[A+i (s)\]) otherwise
[M, s]iϕ ↔ (pre(s) → ∧t∈Ri(s) i[M, t]ϕ)
From ϕ infer [M, s]ϕ
Table 4: Axioms for action models in L⊗
Proposition 39 L⊗ is sound and complete.
Example 6 To get an idea for the axioms involving aware-
ness after actions, consider [A+p]Aip. Surely we want the
agents to be aware of p after becoming aware of p. The
righthand side of this axiom computes to Aip[p\] which is
Ai, a theorem.
The other axiom applies when the agent becomes unaware.
For example, consider [A−p], which stands for ‘the agents be-
come unaware of ϕ’ (not to be seen as gradual fading out,
but as conscious abstraction). After that, the agents are no
longer aware of p, so [A−p]Aip should be false. The right-
hand side of the axiom is ¬pre([A−p]). The action [A−p] is
always executable: precondition . Its negation is therefore
the contradiction ⊥, as desired.
7.4 Expressivity
In this short section we show that the logics L⊗, LE⊗,
LS⊗ are all equally expressive (and therefore, as L⊗ = L,
all equally expressive as L).
Proposition 40 L⊗ and LE⊗ are equally expressive.
Proof. This follows from the following equivalences (em-
beddings). The first demonstrates that L⊗ < LE⊗ and
the second (wherein we use a familiar equivalence, but now
within the language L⊗ instead of L) that L⊗ > LE⊗.
iϕ ⇔ [A+v(ϕ)]KEi ϕ
KEi ϕ ⇔ Aiϕ ∧ iϕ
Proposition 41 LE⊗ and LS⊗ are equally expressive.
Proof. The same argument as in Prop. 23 applies here.
This is an unmistakable though somewhat (we think) sur-
prising result. Even though the logic of implicit knowledge
is more expressive than the logic of explicit knowledge, the
dynamic logic of implicit knowledge is equally expressive as
the dynamic logic of explicit knowledge. And similarly for
speculative knowledge. Example 5 clearly demonstrates the
increase of expressive power when dynamics are added: all of
a sudden we can distinguish the models (M, s) and (M ′, s)!
To conclude the picture — and this paper — the axioma-
tization for the dynamic logic of explicit knowledge is there-
fore simply the one wherein you write KEi ϕ as iϕ ∧ Aiϕ
and then derive that in L⊗. This does not get us the ax-
iomatization for the dynamic logic of speculative knowledge
yet, a missing piece in this puzzle, but as the expressivity
of this logic is now known, this seems of decidedly minor
interest.
8. RELATED WORKS
Our epistemic awareness models are those of [4]. The
language used there is L(,KE , A), but it has the same ex-
pressivity as L(, A), since KEi ϕ is definable as iϕ ∧ Aiϕ
(see Proposition 20). The setting of [4] is otherwise differ-
ent. They assume the accessibility relations to be serial,
transitive and euclidean (KD45). For the axiomatization
one can simply add the characterizing axioms. The com-
plete axiomatization provided there defines awareness Aip
by abbreviation as KEi (p ∨ ¬p).
Another pertinent investigation is [9]. It focusses on ax-
iomatizations, not on expressivity issues. In [9], Halpern
presents axiomatizations for the logics with languages L(, A),
L(KE , A) and L(KE), for the model class where the (KD45)
agents also know their own awareness: t ∈ Ri(s) implies
Ai(s) = Ai(t). In the axiomatization for L(, A) we find
this as Aiϕ → iAiϕ and ¬Aiϕ → i¬Aiϕ. In the axiom-
atization for L(KE , A) this property is, instead, described
by an axiom Aiϕ → KEi Aiϕ and a rule Irr.: “If no proposi-
tional variables in ϕ appear in ψ, then from ¬Aiϕ → ψ infer
ψ” (with the suggestion that the rule might be derivable
from the axiomatization). The rule Irr. is also discussed
in [10]. These additional features seem to explain that the
completeness proof for the logic of explicit knowledge in [9]
is more involved than ours.
The language L(KE) is shown in [9] to have the same ex-
pressivity as L(KE , A) but with the crucial difference that
this is on models with euclidean accessibility relations and
knowledge of awareness. In such models awareness can be
defined in terms of explicit knowledge (as also done in [17]):
Aϕ ↔ KEϕ ∨ KE¬KEϕ. We recall that in our approach
Aϕ ↔ KE(ϕ∨¬ϕ) (similar to [4], see above), but this equiv-
alence does not hold on the more restricted model class.
Some recent studies on dynamics, such as [12, 8, 19] take
a somewhat different approach to awareness, namely syn-
tactic awareness, but employ similar ideas for the dynamics:
updates of structures.
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHERWORK
We have the described the logics of implicit, explicit, and
speculative knowledge, related modal equivalence in these
logics to different forms of bisimulation, compared their ex-
pressivity, and provided sound and complete axiomatiza-
tions. Then we investigated the dynamics of these logics,
where we have shown that any conceivable change of knowl-
edge or awareness can be modelled, we axiomatized the dy-
namic logic of implicit knowledge, and showed that all three
dynamic logics are equally expressive.
Concerning further work, we wish to close some (we think)
little gaps. The axiomatization of the logic of speculative
knowledge with respect to S5 structures is not necessarily
an extension of the current axiomatization. This is because
the speculative knowledge operator has a built-in quantifi-
cation over awareness bisimilar structures. Quantifying over
structures in a more restricted model class therefore changes
the semantics of speculative knowledge; and therefore, also
its axiomatic properties. Another little gap is that, even
though we know the expressivity of the dynamic logic of
speculative knowledge, we do not have (as mentioned above)
its axiomatization (with or without the S5 restriction).
Further ahead, there are alternative notions of knowledge
beyond implicit / explicit / speculative that employ propo-
sitional awareness, for example: an agent knows a formula
ϕ in state s iff in all accessible states t, ϕ is true and the
agent is aware of ϕ (a version explored in [19]). Or consider
knowledge employing a recursive version of awareness: agent
i is aware of KEi ϕ in s iff it is aware of ϕ in s and aware of ϕ
in all t i-accessible from s. Alternative notions of knowledge
would correspond to yet other notions of bisimulation.
The result of Theorem 38 that awareness action models
can encode any form of knowledge and awareness change, is
very strong. But from another perspective, it is also very
weak, because typically only certain protocols or a given and
commonly known set of actions are allowed. Investigating
the dynamic logics of explicit and speculative knowledge for
those settings may be relevant for game theory.
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